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HEALTH CARE WORKERS' ABILITY TO
RECOVER IN TORT FOR TRANSMISSION OR
FEAR OF TRANSMISSION OF HIV
FROM A PATIENT
Richard DeNatale* and Shawn D. Parrisht
I. INTRODUCTION
Persons who work in the health care field, or health care
workers (HCWs), frequently confront HIV- and AIDS-related
issues because their profession brings them into continuous
close contact with persons who are infected with HIV. As
early as 1990, the attention of Congress and the national me-
dia has focused on the possibility that HIV-infected HCWs
might infect their patients. Since that time, a number of leg-
islatures and courts have considered whether a HCW who in-
fects a patient should bear legal responsibility for the infec-
tion, and if so, under what circumstances. Until recently,
however, no court has considered where the legal responsibil-
ity should lie in the reverse situation, where a HCW becomes
infected through contact with a patient. Specifically, no pub-
lished decision has dealt with the question of whether, and
under what set or sets of circumstances, a patient has a legal
duty to warn his or her HCW if he or she is HIV positive.
The answer to this question depends on the resolution of
a host of other issues. When is it foreseeable to a person with
HIV that there is a risk that he or she will pass the disease on
to another? What benefits or detriments do potential plain-
tiffs derive from a disclosure by the HIV-infected person that
he or she has HIV? How would these benefits stack up
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against the burdens imposed on the person who has HIV?
How would the imposition of such a duty affect national pol-
icy on containing the spread of HIV in the health care
setting?
It can be expected that these issues will arise in the
courts with greater frequency.1 The estimated one million
Americans infected with HIV2 will continue to seek health
care. For a number of reasons, at least some of these HIV-
infected patients will not disclose their infection to their
health care providers. During medical procedures, mishaps
will occur that may expose the HCW to the patient's infection
- in a few cases this will result in infection of the HCW.
Some of these HCWs will seek redress in the legal system.
They will ask courts to adapt existing causes of action such as
fraud, infliction of emotional distress, or battery, or to craft
new ones under such theories as strict liability for disease
transmission or "reverse informed consent."3
The legal system's response to such scenarios will signifi-
cantly impact both the health care community and individu-
als with HIV. Court decisions will affect the rights of HIV-
infected individuals and their access to health care, and influ-
ence the efforts of the health care community to prevent
transmission of the virus to HCWs.
1. These issues have recently received attention in the media, through a
discussion of Olympic diver Greg Louganis' disclosure of his HIV infection and,
in particular, on an incident during the 1992 Olympic games in which Mr. Lou-
ganis received emergency stitches for a cut to his scalp without disclosing to the
attending doctor his HIV status. Jere Longman, Olympian Blood: Debate
About HIV Tests Sparked by Diver with AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995, § 4, at
2; Richard Sandomir, Agonizing over Disclosure of AIDS, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26,
1995, § 8, at 6. Indeed, as this article will show, the media focus on Mr. Lou-
ganis' failure to disclose and the risk to the doctor betray a misconstruction of
the risk of HIV transmission and the respective duties of doctor and patient.
2. Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,032(1991). See also Boyce Rensberger, H1VEstimates Reinforced by Random Tests:
300,000 to 1 Million Americans Infected, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1993, at A13
(confirming CDC's estimate of one million Americans infected with HIV and
admitting that the test group sampled probably had a lower incident of infec-
tion than the population at large).
3. A. Samuel Oddi, Reverse Informed Consent: The Unreasonably Danger-
ous Patient, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1993). The underlying assumption of
Oddi's argument is that HCWs and patients have a reciprocal duty to each
other. Id. at 1482. However, this assumption is questionable at best. HCWs
and patients are differently situated. HCWs, due to their superior knowledge
and expertise, owe a fiduciary-like duty to their patients. On the other hand,
patients do not owe a reciprocal duty since they lack that specialized
knowledge.
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This article examines whether there should be a tort for
a patient's failure to disclose HIV infection that results in in-
fection or fear of infection by a HCW. Section II assesses the
magnitude of the risk of HIV infection from patients to
HCWs. Section III reviews the legal issues applicable to this
issue. Section IV surveys the case law concerning responsi-
bility for HIV transmission. Section V addresses the key is-
sue of whether a duty exists on the part of a patient to dis-
close his HIV status to HCWs. This article concludes that
such a duty does not and should not exist under tort law prin-
ciples. Furthermore, such a duty would impede the policies
adopted by the government and the health care establish-
ment to prevent the transmission of HIV.
II. TiEm MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
Several published studies have attempted to quantify,
through a variety of approaches, the risk that a HCW will
become infected through contact with a patient. This evi-
dence suggests that the patient's risk of transmission from a
HCW is extremely low. As of 1991, there were only twenty-
four documented cases of health care workers becoming in-
fected after exposure to patients' blood.4
Nor is transmission likely between a HCW and his or her
patients. As of July, 1992, apart from five patients of the
same Florida dentist,5 no cases documenting transmission of
4. See American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 824 (7th Cir. 1993).
5. See Update: Investigations of Patients Who Have Been Treated by HIV-
Infected Health-Care Workers, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 344-47
(1992). That article contained a study conducted by the CDC after the discov-
ery that a dentist, Dr. Acer, had possibly infected five of his patients. Id. at 344.
One of the patients, Kimberly Bergalis, became a national spokesperson for the
position that HIV-infected health care workers should not be permitted to treat
patients. Id. The study found that of the approximately 1100 of Dr. Acer's pa-
tients the CDC evaluated, 0.5% were infected by the dentist. Id.
As of May 13, 1992, the CDC was aware of HIV test results for 15,795 pa-
tients treated by 32 HIV-infected HCWs (other than the Florida dentist). Id. at
345. The CDC could not confirm that the HCWs had passed the virus on to any
of these other patients. Id. "Data from these investigations, as well as risk
estimates derived from modeling techniques, continue to indicate that the risk
for HIV transmission from an infected HCW to a patient during an invasive
procedure is very small." Id. at 346. See also Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr.
2d 172, 176 (Ct. App. 1994) (discussing the case of Dr. Acer); NATIONAL COMM'N
ON AIDS, PREVENTING HIV TRANSMISSION IN HEALTH CARE SETTINGS 17 (1992)
(citing five other "look back" studies which found that HIV-infected HCWs per-
formed numerous invasive procedures without transmitting HIV to patients).
There have been suggestions that the dentist failed to employ proper infection
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HIV from a health care worker to a patient had been re-
ported.6 The Centers for Disease Control (hereinafter CDC),
the federal agency that coordinates the federal government's
strategy on controlling the spread of HIV, has estimated that
the chance that an HIV-infected HCW will infect a patient
after percutaneous 7 exposure is 0.3%.8 Another source has
estimated that the possibility that an HIV-infected HCW will
infect a patient during an invasive procedure is only about
one in 15,000. 9
A number of factors account for this low risk and the
small number of cases of transmission. First, some incident
must occur that would permit transmission; the most com-
mon example is where a surgeon pricks his finger with a nee-
dle or scalpel. One study found that surgeons receive actual
cuts to their fingers in 2.5% of surgical operations. 10 The
CDC has estimated that percutaneous exposure, including
actual cuts, occurs in approximately 6.9% of invasive surgical
procedures."'
control procedures. Anthony DePalma, AIDS Dentist's Dangerous Professional
Practices, S.F. CHRON., June 27, 1991, at A12. Significantly, the office of that
dentist, Dr. Acer, violated standard infection control procedures in a number of
ways. Zev Remba, H!V, 19 AcA. GEN. DENTISTRY IMPACT 16, 17 (1991). Masks
were worn infrequently and occasionally gloves were not changed between pa-
tient contacts, but were merely washed. Id. His office did not follow a set
schedule of procedures for cleaning equipment. Id. Handpieces and air/water
syringe tips were wiped with alcohol or immersed in germicide at irregular in-
tervals. Id. Sometimes disposable items like saliva ejectors and prophylaxis
cups were reused after being immersed in germicide. Id.
6. See Update: Investigations of Patients Who Have Been Treated by HIV-
Infected Health-Care Workers, supra note 5, at 344-47.
7. "Percutaneous" is defined as that which is effected or performed
through the skin. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 862 (10th ed.
1993).
8. Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone In-
vasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
CDC Recommendations]. See also David K. Henderson et al., Risk for Occupa-
tional Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) Associ-
ated with Clinical Exposures, 113 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 740 (1990).
9. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 176 (Ct. App. 1994). This
figure was calculated by multiplying the chance of percutaneous injury times
the chance that actual infection will occur after percutaneous injury (assumed
to be 0.3%, relying on the CDC statistics). Id.
10. Michael D. Hagen et al., Routine Pre-Operative Screening for HIV: Does
the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to the Patient?, 259 JAMA 1357, 1357
(1988).
11. CDC Recommendations, supra note 8, at 4.
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Furthermore, since the discovery of the HIV virus, the
government and the medical community have developed in-
fection control measures to prevent transmission of the virus
in health care procedures. This system, developed by the
CDC, is commonly known as the "universal precautions."
Since 1991 the universal precautions have been binding on
nearly all health care employers through OSHA regula-
tions. 12 The philosophy underpinning the universal precau-
tions is that every patient should be treated as potentially
infectious, not just those patients the HCW suspects are HIV
infected. Accordingly, HCW's should take - and increas-
ingly do take - these precautions with every patient. 13
Quantitative studies have demonstrated that these measures
significantly reduce the risk of infection both to health care
workers and patients. 14 As HCWs adopt the universal pre-
cautions in all health care settings, the risk of HIV infection
should fall to a level even lower than the current statistics
indicate. Nevertheless, while the universal precautions are
legally mandated, HCWs do not always follow them in
practice.
Second, assuming the opportunity arises, there must be
transmission resulting from blood to blood contact and subse-
quent infection with the virus. An event, such as a needle
stick, in which transmission is possible, does not always re-
12. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1995). See American Dental Ass'n v. Martin,
984 F.2d 823, 824 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding the validity of regulations except
as to sites not controlled by employer, hospital, nursing home, or other entity
not controlled by an entity subject to the rule).
13. American Dental Ass'n, 984 F.2d at 825.
14. One study performed at two hospitals in Richmond, Virginia, compared
the number of incidents of actual exposures to blood and body fluids before and
after the hospitals required its physicians to adhere to universal precautions.
Edward S. Wong et al., Are Universal Precautions Effective in Reducing the
Number of Occupational Exposures Among Health Care Workers?, 265 JAMA
1123 (1991). Fifty-four percent of the physicians practiced barrier precautions
before universal precautions were implemented and 73% did so after they be-
came mandatory. Id. The study found that universal precautions led to a de-
crease in the number of exposure incidents, from 5.07 to 2.66 exposures per
physician per patient care month, and an increase in "averted exposures" (in
which direct contact was prevented by the use of barrier techniques), from 3.41
averted exposures per patient care month to 5.90 exposures per patient care
month. Id. See also Adelisa L. Panlilio et al., Blood Contacts During Surgical
Procedures, 265 JAMA 1533 (1991) (study of types of blood contacts made dur-
ing surgeries indicated that use of barrier precautions such as face shields, fluid
resistant gowns, and glove use would have prevented more than half of the ob-
served blood contacts).
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sult in successful transmission. One study that evaluated the
efficiency of HIV transmission where a HCW is stuck by a
surgical needle contaminated with the virus found the
probability to be less than one percent. 15
Finally - although less is known about this aspect of
HIV infection - successful infection following a transmission
of some of the virus, by which is meant the sustained pres-
ence of HIV in the body, depends on a number of factors.
These factors include the concentration of the virus in the in-
fected person's blood, the amount of blood transferred, the re-
cipient's general health and level of immunity, and other
factors.
16
III. OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Most HCWs who sue patients for failure to disclose HIV
status will bring their action under a theory of negligence.
The HCW will claim that the patient had a duty to disclose
their HIV status, but failed to do so. A typical negligence
cause of action has five elements: (1) existence of a legal duty
to avoid creating a risk of harm to the plaintiff; (2) breach of
that duty; (3) an actual causal link between the breach and
harm; (4) proximate causation; and (5) resulting damages to
the plaintiff.
The fundamental element in establishing tort liability is
whether a duty exists. Under prevailing negligence princi-
ples, a duty arises if it is reasonable under all the circum-
stances that a person should perform that duty. Thus, the
question of whether it is reasonable for a patient to disclose
HIV infection - which translates into a weighing of the ben-
efits and risks of disclosure versus nondisclosure - is the
critical issue for claims of negligent nondisclosure.
Depending on the facts of individual cases, a plaintiff
may also assert other common law tort theories. In addition
to a negligence cause of action (and its derivative tort, negli-
15. CDC Recommendations, supra note 8, at 683. See also Henderson et al.,
supra note 8, at 743-44.
16. J. Louise Gerberding et al., Risk of Transmitting HIV, Cytomegalovirus,
and Hepatitis B Virus to Health Care Workers Exposed to Patients with AIDS
and AIDS-Related Conditions, 156 J. INFECTIoUS DISEASES 1, 6 (1987). HIV's
relative lack of virulency contrasts with that of Hepatitis B, which is transmit-
ted in the same manner as HIV. Thomas A. Peterman & James W. Curran,
Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 256 JAMA 2222, 2225
(1986).
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gent infliction of emotional distress), a complaint might al-
lege that the patient committed a fraud or intentionally in-
flicted emotional distress. However, the intent element and
other heightened requirements of these claims make them
less appealing since a would-be plaintiff must prove these ad-
ditional elements. Moreover, such legal theories could only
arise in situations where the patient affirmatively misrepre-
sented his or her HIV status, rather than simply failed to dis-
close this status.
1 7
Although this article focuses on the duty element as the
critical issue in these cases, some courts have focused on
other elements and imposed strict limitations on them. For
instance, courts have begun to impose a stricter standard of
proof of damage in cases alleging emotional distress damages
for fear of acquiring a disease. Virtually all of the reported
cases involving a failure to warn of HIV infection are actions
for emotional distress damages in which the plaintiff has not
tested HIV positive, but merely fears that he has acquired
HIV. Such claims are possible because, while an accurate
test exists to detect the existence of HIV infection, it can often
take three to six months after an exposure to HIV until sero-
logic tests are positive for antibodies to the virus.1 8 Thus, af-
ter an exposure incident, a person may have to wait up to
three to six months before the test can resolve whether infec-
tion has occurred. 19 A plaintiff may bring claims for HIV ex-
posure during this latency period, even though sufficient time
may not have passed and she has not tested HIV positive.
17. These situations arise more commonly than may be supposed. HCWs
typically request patients to provide at least cursory written or oral medical
histories during the course of treatment. Usually these histories touch upon
some aspects of HIV infection status - such as past conditions, medications,
treating physicians. Thus, in order to support a fraud claim, a HCW bringing
suit may allege these specific statements were false or misleading.
18. See infra note 161.
19. See E. Bailey et al., Absence of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) Proviral Sequences in Seronegative Hemophiliac Men and Sexual Part-
ners of HIV Seropositive Hemophiliacs, 32 TRANSFUSION 104 (1992) (abstracted
in 267 JAMA 2816 (1992)) (accuracy of HIV test and lack of a prolonged latency
period); Gupta et al., Low Prevalence of HIV in High Risk Seronegative Homo-
sexual Men Evidenced by Culture and Polymerase Chain Reaction, 6 J. AIDS
143 (1992) (lack of prolonged HIV latency period). But see C. Robert Horsburgh,
Jr. et al., Duration of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Before Detec-
tion of Antibody, 2 LANCET 638 (1989) (lack of prolonged latency period in most
cases, but acknowledging rate instances of seroconversion more than six
months after infection).
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Typically, even after testing negative, these plaintiffs will
pursue claims for emotional distress damages for the period
before a definitive negative test result is obtained.
In early cases claiming fear of HIV transmission as dam-
ages in a cause of action, the courts were split regarding the
standard applicable to the alleged damage when unsupported
by medical proof. Many courts required that the plaintiff es-
tablish proof of potentially HIV transmissible contact with an
HIV-contaminated article before they would permit such
claims to be presented to a jury.20 Others merely required
that the plaintiff allege an incident in which transmission
might have occurred. 2 Under the less stringent standard, an
allegation that a plaintiff had been stuck by a hypodermic
needle, whose chain of custody could not be established,
would be sufficient to state a cause of action.
In recent years, the highest courts of three states that
had applied the less stringent rule, California, Tennessee,
and Minnesota, adopted a stricter standard in evaluating
claims for fear of acquiring HIV. In Potter v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. ,22 the California Supreme Court held that an ac-
tion based on fear of developing cancer must be based on both
actual exposure to a cancer causing substance and reliable
medical or scientific evidence showing that the exposure
would more likely than not lead to cancer in the future. Sub-
sequently, that same court ordered the California Court of
Appeal to reevaluate, in light of Potter, a case involving a pa-
tient's claim against a surgeon for fear of HIV transmission. 23
Upon remand, the court of appeal held that the plaintiff had
failed to show that it was "more likely than not" that she
would develop AIDS based on evidence that she had under-
gone an operation conducted by an HIV-positive surgeon.24
20. Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Neal v.
Neal, 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp.,
639 So. 2d 861 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Hare v. State, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1021 (Ct.
Cl. 1989).
21. Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994); Carroll v.
Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110CV00232, 1992 WL
276717 (Tenn. App. Oct. 12, 1992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993); see also
Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
22. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
23. Kerins v. Hartley, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994).
24. Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 179 (Ct. App. 1994). The court
observed that "the detailed operative report of the surgery does not indicate
that any cuts were sustained by Dr. Gordon, or that there were any other unu-
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Tennessee and Minnesota have adopted an "actual expo-
sure" rule. In Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Serv-
ices, Inc. ,25 the plaintiff, an elderly woman visiting her ailing
sister in the hospital, sued a hospital for negligence after she
accidentally pricked herself with a hypodermic needle when
she stuck her hand in a needle container that she mistook for
a paper tower dispenser. The Tennessee Supreme Court re-
versed the ruling of the court of appeals, and held that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the needle was actually
contaminated with HIV or had been used on an HIV-infected
person.26 In KA.C. v. Benson,2 7 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a patient could not maintain a cause of action
against an HIV-infected physician who had performed inva-
sive procedures on the patient while wearing gloves.28 The
Court held that only where the plaintiff can show "actual ex-
posure" to HIV could the patient maintain a cause of action
for fear of HIV transmission:
Documented modes of HIV transmission include: unpro-
tected sexual intercourse with an HIV-infected person; us-
ing contaminated needles; contact with HIV-infected
blood, blood components, or blood products by parenteral
mucous membrane or non-intact skin; transplants of HIV-
infected organs and/or tissues; transfusions of HIV-in-
fected blood; artificial insemination of HIV-infected se-
men; and perinatal transmission from mother to child
around the time of birth.29
sual occurrences during the lengthy surgery," id. at 174, and used a statistical
approach to conclude that the possibility that an incident occurred - such as a
needle prick - in which the needle had the blood of the HIV-positive surgeon,
was only approximately 1 in 15,000. See id. at 175 n.3; see also supra note 9
and accompanying text. Given the negative result plaintiff had received on an
HIV test, plaintiff failed to prove that it was "more likely than not" that she
would develop AIDS. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
The Kerins ruling was anticipated by another panel of the California Court
of Appeal in Herbert v. Regents of the University of California, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d
709 (1994). In Herbert, the court applied the Potter "more likely than not" stan-
dard to find that the plaintiff had not proved entitlement to recovery for fear of
HIV transmission for an accidental needle stick where there was no showing
the needle contained HIV. Id. at 711-12.
25. 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585
(Tenn. 1993).
26. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585
(Tenn. 1993).
27. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
28. KA.C., 527 N.W.2d at 555.
29. Id. at 558 (footnote omitted).
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These decisions reflect an increasing hostility to cases in-
volving plaintiffs who claim that they fear they will acquire a
disease. Rules such as the one requiring plaintiffs to prove
that there was an actual potential for exposure, such as an
HIV-infected needle, or the "more likely than not" rule
adopted in California, will cut back considerably on the
number of cases brought for fear of acquiring AIDS.
Both of these rules, however, focus on the likelihood that
the plaintiff actually will acquire AIDS, or become HIV in-
fected. They do not affect the legal duty of the defendant: if
the plaintiff can prove that he or she was actually exposed to
HIV, under California law "more likely than not" exposed to
HIV, a defendant can be held liable for future trauma.
IV. SURVEY OF THE CASE LAW
No case has ever held that a patient has a duty to dis-
close her HIV status to a HCW. Neither has any court im-
posed a duty in a closely analogous situation. But, there is a
considerable body of case law regarding HIV transmission.
Many of these cases have concluded that the plaintiff stated a
legal cause of action for HIV transmission. In most of these
cases, however, factors other than a straightforward balanc-
ing of the risk of harm against the burden of imposing the
duty account for the imposition of liability. In particular,
most of the cases involve either parties in a special relation-
ship with each other, such as sexual partners, or situations
where one party owes a heightened duty of care to the other,
such as the special duty owed by the HCW to the patient.
The reasoning in these cases does not justify imposing a duty
on a patient to disclose HIV status to a HCW. A patient does
not have a special relationship with a HCW. Nor does a pa-
tient owe a heightened duty of care to a HCW. We then ex-
amine the only two decisions on point. The first allowed a
HCW to sue for fear of HIV infection.30 The second squarely
held that a patient has no duty to disclose her HIV status to a
HCW.31
30. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
760 [Vol. 36
1996] HEALTH CARE WORKERS AND HIV 761
A. Disclosure by Sexual Partners
Numerous cases have held that a sexual partner with a
sexually transmitted disease has a duty to warn the other
partner of the infectious condition. 2 In Doe v. Johnson,33 the
court squarely held that a person can be held liable for failure
to warn a sexual partner that he has HIV.34 The court denied
defendant Earvin "Magic" Johnson's motion to dismiss such a
complaint and held that a sexual partner infected with HIV
has a duty to warn before engaging in sexual relations.3 5 In
dicta, other courts have indicated that a person has a duty to
disclose his HIV status to a sexual partner. In Petri v. Bank
of New York, 36 the court stated that the special relationship
37
between sexual partners can give rise to claims under negli-
gence theories for failure to warn, or under misrepresenta-
tion theories (if misrepresentation is present) if the defend-
ant was HIV positive.38 However, the court dismissed the
complaint for plaintiff's failure to establish that he actually
had HIV.
3 9
32. Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 687 (Ala. 1989); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal.
Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1990) (person with genital herpes has duty to warn poten-
tial sexual partner of infectious condition); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal.
Rptr. 273, 276 n.3 (Ct. App. 1984); B.N. v. K.K, 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988);
C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 442-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
although there is a duty to avoid transmission of a dangerous communicable
disease, respondent had no duty to warn sexual partner that he had AIDS when
it was not reasonably foreseeable that he had or could transmit the disease);
R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Mussivand v. David,
544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989); see generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort
Liability for Infliction of Venereal Disease, 40 A.L.R. 4th 1089 (1995).
33. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
34. Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1393.
35. The Doe opinion provides a very detailed assessment of whether one
sexual partner owes a duty to warn the other sexual partner that he or she has
HIV before engaging in sexual relations. Id. at 1393. The court expressly found
that no special relationship exists between sexual partners and that no height-
ened duty of care exists because of the relationship. Id. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the court based its conclusion on the particularized context of a sexual
relationship: The court's assessment of the burden placed on a defendant con-
sidered only the burden associated with one sexual partner informing another
that he or she is H1V positive. Id.
36. 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
37. See also Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1990) (trial court recog-
nized existence of special relationship between sexual partners).
38. Petri, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
39. Id. at 613-14. At least two other cases have dismissed complaints alleg-
ing a sexual partner's negligence in failing to warn of his or her HIV status,
although the bases for the dismissals in these cases were failure to properly
allege causation or damages, not the absence of a duty to warn. See Neal v.
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Similarly, in J.B. v. Bohonovsky,40 the court granted de-
fendant estate's motion for summary judgment against plain-
tiff's claims that the decedent had committed the intentional
tort of exposing defendant to HIV and of intentionally in-
flicting emotional distress. 41 Here plaintiff had failed in two
ways to meet the necessary threshold for his case to proceed.
First, in the absence of any proof that he was infected with
HIV, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the physical injury
needed to sustain an action for intentional exposure to HIV.42
Second, plaintiff had not substantiated his claim of emotional
distress through his sworn testimony or that of an expert.43
In granting the motion, the court observed in an aside that a
person who knowingly has AIDS has the duty to disclose it
and take the steps necessary to protect against its transmis-
sion to others.44
These decisions have limited applicability to the issue of
a patient's duty to disclose HIV infection to a HCW. Their
analysis of the duty question is based on the existence of a
special relationship between sexual partners or on the partic-
ularized circumstances of a sexual relationship. The balanc-
ing calculus of these decisions seems to be predicated on the
understanding that there is little or no value in an HIV-posi-
tive person having unprotected sex, as balanced against the
sexual partner's interest in deciding whether to risk becom-
ing infected through sexual contact. If the infected person
wishes to keep her HIV status confidential, that person can
forego sexual activity.45
B. Disclosure by Medical Professionals
Under the doctrine of informed consent, health care pro-
fessionals have a duty to disclose to patients information that
a reasonable patient would want to know, or, in some juris-
Neal, 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup.
Ct. 1987).
40. 835 F. Supp. 796 (D.N.J. 1993).
41. Bohonovsky, 835 F. Supp. at 799.
42. Id. at 800.
43. Id. at 798.
44. Id. at 797.
45. None of these courts have examined whether it is reasonable for the
plaintiff to presume that his prospective sexual partner is HIV negative and,
based on that presumption, engage in unprotected sex. Arguably, such behav-
ior is unreasonable given the current level of awareness of HIV today.
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dictions, information that a reasonable professional would
disclose. In the context of HIV infection, only one published
decision has discussed whether a physician can be held liable
for failing to disclose positive HIV status prior to performing
a procedure on a patient.46 That court held that a physician's
failure to make such a disclosure can constitute negligence,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.47
In Faya v. Almaraz,48 the Maryland Court of Appeals up-
held two complaints alleging negligence, negligent failure to
obtain informed consent, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress against the estate of an HIV-infected sur-
geon on the basis that the surgeon failed to inform his pa-
tients of his condition before performing surgery on them.
49
In discussing why the physician's failure to warn constituted
an action in negligence, the court stated:
Under the allegations of the appellants' complaints, taken
as true, it was foreseeable that Dr. Almaraz might trans-
mit the AIDS virus to his patients during invasive sur-
gery. Thus, we are unable to say, as a matter of law, that
Dr. Almaraz owed no duty to the appellants, either to re-
frain from performing the surgery or to warn them of his
condition. This is so even though the medical literature
indicates that, with proper barrier techniques, the risk of
46. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
47. Id. at 333.
48. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
49. The Faya court cited the decision of the lower court in Carroll v. Sisters
of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12,
1992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993), for the proposition that a plaintiff
could recover for fear of AIDS even when the plaintiff could not show actual
HIV exposure, because the key factor was whether plaintiff's fear was sup-
ported by "sufficient indicia of genuineness and reasonableness." Faya, 620
A.2d at 336-37. The Tennessee Supreme Court later overturned Carroll and
held that a plaintiff must prove actual exposure to HIV to recover damages for
fear of acquiring AIDS. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc.,
868 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tenn. 1993). In noting that the Faya court had relied on
the lower court opinion in Carroll to embrace a "reasonableness" standard as
opposed to an actual exposure test, the Tennessee Supreme Court pointed out
that Maryland's was the only state court of last resort to accept the reasonable-
ness standard. Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 591-92. The Tennessee Supreme Court
then criticized the reasonableness standard in the context of emotional distress
for fear of acquiring HIV. Id. at 593. These objections dealt with the fear of
false claims for emotional distress. Id. First, the reasonableness standard was
too lax to screen out fraudulent claims due to the inherently subjective nature
of claims of emotional distress. Id. Second, the standard removed the "objec-
tive component" that assured that plaintiff's claims were founded in an inde-
pendently verifiable event. Id.
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HIV transmission is extremely low, for legal scholars have
long held that the seriousness of potential harm, as well as
its probability, contributes to a duty to prevent it.50
In Kerins v. Hartley,5 1 a case involving an HIV-positive
doctor who performed invasive surgery on a patient, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal indicated that the surgeon had a duty
to use due care during the surgery to ensure that his blood
did not come into contact with his patient, and to comply with
CDC guidelines governing performance of exposure-prone
procedures.2 The court went on to hold, however, that the
patient had not established that it was "more likely than not"
that she would become HIV infected, and was barred from
recovery on that basis.53
Administrative agencies charged with developing guide-
lines for the medical profession, both at the federal and state
level, have come to different conclusions on this issue. In its
1991 guidelines, the CDC encouraged doctors who performed
basic procedures and feared HIV infection to be tested. 54 In
addition, an expert review panel procedure was established
to evaluate whether an HIV-positive doctor could continue to
perform basic procedures.55 These guidelines stated that an
HIV-infected physician should not perform an exposure-
prone basic procedure without informing the patient of his in-
fection."6 At least one court faced with deciding whether a
physician or HCW had breached his or her duty has looked to
the CDC guidelines to determine the contours of that duty. 7
However, some states have adopted different guidelines.
New York, for example, has stated that disclosure of HIV sta-
tus by a doctor is not necessary.5 8
50. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (Md. 1993).
51. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Ct. App. 1994).
52. Kerins, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177-78.
53. Id. at 179.
54. CDC Recommendations, supra note 8, at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id. But see Thaddeus Nodzenski, HIV-Infected Health Care Profession-
als and Informed Consent, 2 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J., 299, 325 (1993)
(noting that imposing a duty on HCW's to disclose their HIV status may not be
feasible due to limitations on the HIV antibody test, such as "false positives,
false negatives, and the time it takes for HIV antibodies to develop").
57. See, e.g., Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 177 (Ct. App. 1994).
58. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, POLICY STATEMENT & GUIDELINES TO PRE-
VENT TRANSMISSION OF HIV THROUGH MEDICAL/DENTAL PROCEDURES 1 (1992)
(hereinafter 1992 N.Y. POLICY STATEMENT]. Those guidelines state that
"[r]equiring health care workers to inform patients or employers that they are
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New York rejects disclosure because it would serve as a
disincentive for doctors to discover their HIV status.59 Fur-
thermore, disclosure would jeopardize their careers without
decreasing the risk of transmitting HIV to patients.6 0 New
York's policy also states that "HIV infection alone does not
justify limiting [a HCW's] professional duties[, and] there is
no need to alter . . . [such a person's] practice unless his
health status impairs his job performance." 61 Thus, New
York's policy does not focus on the risk of HIV transmission,
but rather on the risks caused by HCWs whose professional
skills are impaired by AIDS.62 To protect patients from HIV
transmission during invasive procedures, the policy envisions
a voluntary expert review panel evaluation, which would
place limitations, if necessary, on an infected HCW's prac-
tice. 63 The panel would examine the presence of weeping le-
sions, compliance with infection control procedures, and the
nature of the invasive procedures performed.64
Connecticut has staked out an intermediate position be-
tween the CDC guidelines, which require disclosure, and the
New York policy, which specifically rules out disclosure.
6 5
Like New York, Connecticut's guidelines assume that HIV in-
fection alone does not justify limiting a HCW's professional
duties. 66 Like New York, Connecticut's guidelines refer an
infected HCW to an expert review panel that focuses on com-
pliance with the universal precautions, the nature of the
work, and whether the illness interferes with the ability to
perform the work in deciding whether the HCW should con-
tinue to provide services.6 7 Significantly, the panel will re-
view on a case-by-case basis whether the HCW should dis-
close his HIV status to a patient.68
HIV-positive will only serve as a deterrent to workers seeking voluntary testing
and medical evaluation. It would also endanger the professional careers of com-
petent and needed health personnel who pose no risk to patients." Id. at 2.
59. Id.
60. Nodzinski, supra note 56, at 330.




65. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERV., STATE OF CONN., POLICY ON HIV/HBV
INFECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS 5 (1992).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. The Connecticut policy does not state specific guidelines for determining
if disclosure is advisable. See id.
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Michigan's guidelines also provide for disclosure of a
HCW's status on a case-by-case basis. 9 But unlike Connecti-
cut, Michigan specifies the factors to consider in making the
determination: whether exposure has occurred, an assess-
ment of specific risks, confidentiality issues, and available re-
sources.7" But courts in other states have taken positions
contrary to these guidelines.7 '
The issue of whether a physician is required to disclose
his or her HIV-positive status to a patient is therefore un-
resolved. Federal and state medical agencies have adopted
various approaches to the issue. And, only one decision,
Faya, has squarely held that such a failure constitutes negli-
gence and battery.72
This authority on a physician's duty to disclose HIV in-
fection has only limited applicability to the question of
whether a patient has such a duty to disclose. The relation-
ship between the patient and the HCW is a dependent one, in
which the patient relies on the HCW's greater skill and
knowledge. For this reason, as a general rule, HCWs owe a
heightened duty to avoid the creation of a risk of harm to pa-
tients. But the inverse is not true. HCWs are not in a depen-
dent position vis-d-vis the patient; and the patient does not
have a reciprocal heightened duty of care to the HCW that
may give rise to a duty to disclose.73
69. MICH. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, MICHIGAN RECOMMENDATIONS ON HIV-IN-
FECTED HEALTH CARE WORKERS 8 (1991).
70. Id.
71. A few courts have permitted hospitals to prevent HIV-infected HCWs
from performing invasive procedures. E.g., Estate of Behringer v. Princeton
Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991); see also
Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding hospital's
firing of male nurse for refusal to submit to an HIV test).
72. In an unpublished decision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals appears to
have agreed with the approach taken by the Faya court in holding that a physi-
cian's failure to warn his or her patients that he or she has HIV can constitute
negligent infliction of emotional distress or "negligent nondisclosure claim."
K.A.C. v. Benson, Nos. C6-93-1203, C5-93-1306, C4-93-1328, 1993 WL 515825
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1993), rev'd, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995). However,
the KA.C. opinion relied on both Faya and Kerins in deciding that a physician
has a duty to disclose that he or she is HIV positive to a patient. Id.
73. But see generally Oddi, supra note 3. Professor Oddi argues that a pa-
tient has a duty to disclose his or her HIV status to a HCW based on the HCW's
duty to disclose to the patient the material risk of a medical procedure. Id. at
1417 n.19. His fundamental premise is that patients and doctors are similarly
situated with respect to each other and thus owe each other a reciprocal duty.
Id. Yet that premise is questionable at best. The HCW's superior expertise and
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C. Possible HIV Transmission in Other Contexts
A handful of cases have dealt with other situations where
plaintiffs have alleged that defendants negligently caused
them to be exposed to HIV. These cases do not necessarily
involve disclosure issues; they involve, more generally, al-
leged duties to prevent possible HIV transmission. The cases
fall into three categories: (1) cases where the defendants
have custody over an HIV-infected individual; (2) cases where
the defendants control the premises where possible HIV in-
fection occurs; and (3) products liability cases. The facts of
these cases limit their applicability to the issue of whether a
patient must disclose his HIV status to a HCW.
The first category of cases involves institutional settings
where patients with AIDS are under custodial care. Courts
have imposed on such institutions a duty to supervise such
patients who may become violent and infect others, or at least
to warn persons called to restrain violent patients that the
patient has AIDS or is HIV infected. In Johnson v. West Vir-
ginia University Hospitals, Inc. ,74 the court affirmed a verdict
for a guard bitten by an AIDS patient, on the theory that the
hospital failed to follow its own regulations requiring the
posting of a notice near a patient if the patient is infected. 5
In Hare v. State,v6 the court recognized that the state had a
duty to supervise an AIDS-infected prisoner sent to a hospital
for medical treatment who bit a surgical technician at the
hospital. 77
In a similar vein, one court has indicated that an institu-
tion that places an HIV-infected patient in the care of an-
other person can be liable for failing to warn the care giver of
the patient's HIV infection. In J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hospi-
tal,78 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals apparently ac-
cepted the plaintiff's argument that a hospital could be liable
for failure to warn a patient's brother, who transported the
patient to another treatment facility, that the patient had
knowledge places her in a completely different position with respect to the pa-
tient. See discussion supra note 3.
74. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
75. Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 893-94.
76. 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 1058 (N.Y.
1991).
77. Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
78. 996 F.2d 276 (l1th Cir. 1993), certifying question to 635 So. 2d 945
(Fla.), and conformed to answer, 27 F.3d 506 (11th Cir. 1994).
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AIDS. 79 The plaintiff alleged that while transporting the pa-
tient, the patient began thrashing about, dislocating his hep-
arin lock.8° The plaintiff came into contact with the patient's
blood when he placed his hand, which had been cut during a
fishing accident, on the patient's heparin lock."' Subse-
quently, the plaintiff tested positive for HIV.8 2
One case suggests a contrary result. In Funeral Services
by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hospital, 3 the court
upheld the trial court's dismissal of an action by an em-
balmer, alleging battery against a hospital that released to
him the body of a patient who had died of AIDS.8 4 The court
held that the complaint failed to show the intent necessary to
sustain a cause of action based on battery, 5 although it ex-
pressly held open the possibility that such facts might consti-
tute negligence. 6
A second category of cases has indicated that owners of
premises, including employers, have a duty to keep the prem-
ises clear of items contaminated with HIV. In Marchica v.
Long Island Railroad,7 a railroad employee alleged under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)88 that his em-
ployer negligently failed to maintain a safe working place by
allowing homeless persons, including intravenous drug users,
to break into a trainman's room at a railroad station.8 9 When
79. Sacred Heart Hosp., 996 F.2d at 278.
80. Id. at 277. A heparin lock is attached to the patient's arm and provides
a port for inserting an intravenous needle into the patient's vein. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court was unable to decide, for the purpose of evaluating de-
fendant's statute of limitations defense, whether the action should be character-
ized as one for general negligence or for medical malpractice under Florida
state law. Id. at 277-78. The court of appeals certified the question to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, which ruled that the lawsuit was not founded on medical
malpractice. J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 635 So. 2d 945, 949 (Fla. 1994). The
court of appeals then reversed the district court and permitted the plaintiff to
proceed on a general negligence theory, since plaintiff was not obligated to com-
ply with the special procedures and statute of limitation in Florida malpractice
law. J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 27 F.3d 506, 507 (11th Cir. 1994).
83. 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991), overruled in part by Courtney v. Courtney,
437 S.E.2d 436, 440 (W. Va. 1993) (overruling Gregory on a statute of limita-
tions issue).
84. Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc., 413 S.E.2d at 84-85.
85. Id. at 81-82.
86. Id.
87. 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994).
88. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
89. Marchica, 31 F.3d at 1205.
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the employee tried to secure a grate in the room as he was
instructed to do, he slipped and fell in a trash receptacle
causing a hypodermic needle concealed in the garbage to
pierce his hand.90 The employee sued his employer for recov-
ery of emotional distress damages for fear of acquiring
AIDS.91 The court upheld a jury verdict in the plaintiff's
favor, reasoning that even though plaintiff had not tested
positive for HIV and had not demonstrated that the needle
contained HIV, the physical injury test for negligent infliction
of emotional distress was stated.92
In Castro v. New York Life Insurance Co.,93 plaintiff
stuck his hand in the trash on defendant's premises and was
stuck by a needle.94 The court held that plaintiff stated a
cause of action for fear of acquiring HIV based on defendant's
failure to discard hypodermic needles appropriately.
95
A third category of cases involves the duty of a product
manufacturer to produce reasonably safe products. In
Seimon v. Becton Dickinson & Co. ,96 a nurse who was pricked
by a self-injecting syringe sued the syringe manufacturer for
emotional suffering caused by the possibility that she was in-
fected with HIV during the incident. 97 The Ohio Court of Ap-
peals recognized that there might exist some set of facts
under which a syringe manufacturer would have a duty to
avoid injury to users of its product, but held that the plaintiff
had not shown that she was, in fact, exposed to HIV.98 She
therefore could not maintain a cause of action for fear of ac-
quiring AIDS.99
These cases all involve particular factual contexts limit-
ing their importance for deciding whether a patient has a
duty to warn a HCW when he or she has HIV. As shown
above, the cases involve some special control by a defendant
over the possible risk of HIV infection - either through cus-
tody of an infected individual, control of premises containing
90. Id. at 1200.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1205, 1208.
93. 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
94. Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
95. Id. at 698.
96. 632 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
97. Seimon, 632 N.E.2d at 604.
98. Id. at 605.
99. Id. at 604-05.
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HIV-contaminated needles, or the manufacture of an unrea-
sonably dangerous product. Courts have premised this duty
on "special relationships:" the premises owner's special duty
to keep the premises free of hidden hazards, the employer's
duty to provide a safe work environment for the employee,
and the manufacturer's duty to avoid placing an unreasona-
bly unsafe product into the stream of commerce. None of
these cases provide support for a general duty to warn some-
one when that person is about to enter into a situation in
which a risk of HIV transmission exists. 00
D. Cases Involving a HCW as Plaintiff
Only two decisions - one published, one unpublished -
have addressed the duty to inform a HCW that a patient is
HIV positive before that HCW performs an invasive proce-
dure on the patient. Both of these cases held that, under a
negligence analysis, no duty exists. 01
The first case involved claims against an officer with cus-
tody of a patient. In Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 1°2 the court
100. Another set of cases held that a provider of HIV-infected blood, or a
substance contaminated with HIV, can be liable for exposing a plaintiff to HIV.
In Marriott v. Sedco Forex International Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59 (D.
Mass. 1993), the court held that, under the Jones Act, an oil rig worker could
sue the oil rig owner for supplying a hepatitis vaccine, which possibly contained
HIV, for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 73-74. In Lubowitz v.
Albert Einstein Medical Center, 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), the plaintiff
sued her physician and his hospital for allegedly introducing HIV infected pla-
cental blood into her body during an in vitro fertilization procedure. Id. The
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the ground that
HIV tests administered after the procedure demonstrated that the plaintiff had
not been infected with HIV. Id. In so ruling, however, the court observed that
"[w]e realize that there are factual questions with respect to the appellees' neg-
ligence .... " Id. at 5. At least, the court indicated that such facts might consti-
tute negligence. Id. In Howard v. Alexandria Hospital, 429 S.E.2d 22 (Va.
1993), the court held that a patient who alleged fear of HIV after she had un-
dergone a surgery in which unsanitary instruments were used could maintain a
cause of action in negligence. Id. at 25. These cases are inapposite to any deci-
sion to impose a requirement that HIV-infected patients warn their HCWs.
These cases are more akin to (strict) product liability than negligent failure to
warn cases.
101. Although no case has held that nondisclosure by a patient can occasion
liability to a HCW, a patient's failure to inform a physician of a relevant fact
concerning his or her health can constitute contributory negligence or form the
basis for a comparative negligence defense. See Caroll J. Miller, Annotation,
Patient's Failure to Reveal Medical History to Physician as Contributory Negli-
gence or Assumption of Risk in Defense of Malpractice Action, 33 A.L.R. 4th 790
(1984).
102. 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
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granted summary judgment in favor of the county when a
correctional officer brought an HIV-positive prisoner to a phy-
sician for medical treatment.1 0 3 The physician alleged that
the officer should have warned him of the patient's HIV sta-
tus so that he could have taken heightened infection control
precautions when performing surgery on the patient. 104 Not-
ing that the complaint alleged a theory that was "on the fron-
tier of liability for negligence,"' 0 5 and that it was "paramount
that plaintiff show a specific duty on the part of the defend-
ant,"10 6 the court found that the officer had no duty to dis-
close to the physician.1 0 7 In doing so, the court relied on the
existence of a state statute that prohibited disclosure of HIV
test results.'-0
While this case did not directly involve a patient's duty to
disclose HIV infection to a HCW, its holding has implications
for this question. Ordway involves the same argument that a
HCW might make in support of a patient disclosure require-
ment: that disclosure would permit the HCW to take height-
ened infection control precautions to minimize the risk of
HIV transmission. But Ordway also involves statutory pro-
tection of the confidentiality of HIV test results. Thus, on a
fundamental level, the situation in Ordway addresses similar
burdens and benefits that are relevant to a determination of
the existence of a patient's general duty of disclosure to a
HCW. 0 9
The other decision - an unpublished one - involved the
very issue addressed in this article. In Boulais v. Lustig,"0 a
surgical assistant sued a patient for failing to disclose her
HIV status. The HCW had been cut by a scalpel that may
have had some of the patient's blood on it; the HCW argued
that, had she been informed of the patient's HIV infection,
the HCW would have taken additional infection control pre-
cautions that would have prevented the injury.





108. Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
109. See discussion infra part V.
110. No. BC038105, slip op. (Super. Ct. L.A. County June 18, 1993). A word
of disclosure is merited here. The authors of this article were counsel for the
patient/defendant in this case, and argued that she had no duty to disclose her
HIV status to her HCWs. The case has been resolved through a settlement.
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In Boulais, the trial court held that a patient had no duty
to disclose that she was HIV positive to her HCW. The jury
initially found in favor of the plaintiff; however, the court
granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the negligence claim.111 In so ruling, the court
relied on both an analysis of general negligence principles
and public policy:
No duty of a patient to be truthful concerning his/her
medical condition with his/her medical care providers has
been established by court decision or law. Physicians and
health care providers owe a duty of care to patients. How-
ever, no such corresponding duty of patients has been es-
tablished by court decision or statute. Further, the stated
governmental policy regarding AIDS and HIV-positive pa-
tients is to maintain the confidentiality of their medical
condition. An imposition of a duty of a patient to disclose
truthfully, when asked, their medical condition would not
be consistent with such governmental policy. 1 12
The Boulais decision - though unpublished and contain-
ing only the briefest analysis - raises the major issues in-
volved in the question of a patient's duty to disclose HIV sta-
tus. As a starting point, Boulais emphasizes the different
duties of HCWs and patients - while a HCW owes the pa-
tient a duty to avoid a risk of harm to the patient, the patient
owes no such reciprocal duty to the HCW. The decision then
notes that, under general negligence principles, no court has
found a duty by a patient to disclose HIV status. Finally, this
conclusion is buttressed by public policy concerns that are the
basis for statutes that guarantee the confidentiality of a pa-
tient's HIV status.
V. DUTY
The issue of whether a legal duty to another exists is al-
ways, in the first instance, a task for the court, not the jury,
111. The court, however, permitted the verdict for plaintiff on the fraud
claim to stand. The record contained evidence that the defendant misrepre-
sented information that would have tended to reveal her HIV status on an in-
take form she filled out prior to surgery.
112. Boulais v. Lustig, No. BC038105, slip op. (Super. Ct. L.A. County June
18, 1993) (minute order granting motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict). Under California court rules, trial court decisions such as this one have
no precedential value and may not be cited as authority to any court. See CAL.
R. CT. 977.
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to determine. 1 13 In determining whether to permit a health
care worker to sue a patient for actual HIV transmission, or
for fear of HIV transmission, a court might frame a patient's
duty in a number of ways. In its broadest formulation, pa-
tients might have to inform the health care facility that they
have HIV, or even that they are at risk of HIV infection. A
less stringent duty, at least in theory, would require a patient
to avoid affirmative misrepresentations of HIV status. How-
ever, in reality such a duty would be little different from the
broader formulation, because patients are routinely asked
general questions about their medical history and condition
that would implicate some aspect of HIV infection.
This article argues that no duty does, nor should, exist on
the part of a patient to disclose HIV infection to a HCW.
First, we consider whether patients have a special relation-
ship to their HCWs that would establish such a duty.114 Sec-
ond, we consider whether a weighing of the benefits and bur-
dens associated with such a duty justifies the creation of a
general duty to disclose.'1 5 Third, we consider how govern-
mental policies on HIV prevention affect the issue." 6 Fi-
nally, we consider whether, and in what respect, this particu-
lar question may be beyond the authority and competence of
a court to decide.1 7
A. Does a Special Relationship Exist?
In some cases, a special relationship exists between a
plaintiff and a defendant that creates a heightened duty of
care on the part of the defendant. 1 8 Although HCWs, partic-
ularly physicians, have a fiduciary-like relationship with
their patients, no case has ever held that patients have a sim-
ilar duty toward their physicians or HCWs. Courts have rec-
113. See, e.g., St. Francis Medical Ctr. v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr. 765,
767 (Ct. App. 1987); Strauss v. Belle Realty, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (N.Y. 1985);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B (1965).
114. See supra part V.A.
115. See supra part V.B.
116. See supra part V.C.
117. See supra part V.D.
118. In Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1990), the court held that a
person has a duty to disclose infectious diseases to a sexual partner based on
the existence of a special relationship between sexual partners. Id. at 567. See
also Petri v. Bank of New York, 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
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ognized that patients and doctors are differently situated. As
one court has noted:
Health-care providers and institutions should consider
ethical aspects of the doctor-patient relationship in exam-
ining the risk posed by health-care providers infected with
HIV. The patient and doctor occupy unequal positions in
the relationship. The doctor is trained to recognize, diag-
nose, and avoid contracting the patient's disease. The
doctor stands in a position of trust - a fiduciary position
- in relation to the patient.... The patient, on the other
hand, has no corresponding ethical duty to the doctor.
The patient is neither trained nor expected to ascertain
the provider's health status. While secretive patients may
transmit their diseases to unwary doctors, doctors are re-
sponsible for both their own health and the health of their
patients. 119
A central tenet of medical malpractice law is that the patient
has a right to receive information about the risks and benefits
of any procedure before the patient is deemed to have con-
sented to the medical procedure.12 The basis for the physi-
cian's duty to disclose risks is the physician's superior knowl-
edge of medical procedures and their risks.' 21 Patients are in
a completely different position. Unlike HCWs, patients lack
specialized knowledge and medical training. They must
therefore depend on the disclosure by HCWs of risks and ben-
efits of treatment.
Physicians and other HCWs know that the patients they
see may be infected with HIV; they are more likely to recog-
nize this fact than other groups in American society. Fur-
thermore, HCWs cannot reasonably rely on the failure of a
patient to state that he or she is HIV positive to conclude that
the patient is HIV negative - if only because most persons
who are infected do not know it.' 22 Thus, no relationship
119. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1282 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991) (citing G. Keyes, Health Care Professionals with AIDS: The
Risk of Transmission Balanced Against the Interests of Professionals and Insti-
tutions, 16 J.C. & U.L. 589, 605 (1990)).
120. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
121. Id. "The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical
arts, and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlighten-
ment with which to reach an intelligent decision." Id. at 780.
122. Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing
in the Prevention of HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
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akin to special relationships elsewhere recognized by the law
can be said to exist.
B. Is There a General Duty to Avoid a Risk of Harm?
Whether a general duty arises in the negligence context
depends on a number of factors. Every person has a duty to
avoid creating an "unreasonable" risk of harm to every other
person and to use "ordinary" caution in carrying out any ac-
tivity.1 23 Courts have often framed the issue as a balancing
test, where the likelihood of harm and the benefit to be
gained by imposition of the duty is balanced against the bur-
den attendant to the duty.124 Courts sometimes resolve the
imposition or non-imposition of a duty by reference to the
public policy implications of the new duty.1
25
1. The Risk of Harm and the Benefit of Disclosure
The issue of whether the risk of harm justifies requiring
a patient to disclose his or her HIV status actually encom-
passes three distinct considerations: (a) the gravity of the
harm; (b) the likelihood that the conduct will cause harm;
and (c) the benefit gained by reducing the likelihood of harm
through the imposition of a duty. In its most mathematical
formulation, this issue is resolved by balancing quantified
risk against the burden of imposition of the duty. 1 26 Quanti-
fied risk is obtained by multiplying the reduced likelihood
that the harm will occur if a duty is imposed by the magni-
tude of the harm averted.
REP. 509 (1987) (noting that most of the 1.0 to 1.5 million infected persons in
the U.S. are unaware that they are infected with HIV).
123. E.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342-43 (Cal.
1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).
124. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied,
160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947); Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 39 (Cal.
1975); W. PAGE KEATON ET AL., PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS § 31, at 171-72
(5th ed. 1984).
125. See Stephen K v. Roni L., 640 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1980) (sexual
partner's false representation that she was taking birth control pills did not
give rise to an action for "wrongful birth" from other partner); Barbara A. v.
John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1983) (interpreting Stephen K as reflect-
ing public policy judgment that no action for wrongful birth of a child could be
had); see also Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
126. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied,
160 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1947).
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a. The Gravity of the Harm127
In practice, there is no easy way to perform the calcula-
tion to arrive at a quantified risk;128 nor is there a way to
quantify the burden imposed by a duty. Clearly, the conse-
quences of HIV transmission are devastating. Nevertheless,
the law permits many activities which might result in the
death of another. For example, there is no duty not to drive
an automobile, although the consequence of being hit by one
can be extremely harmful. 129
In its July 1992 report, "Preventing HIV Transmission in
Health Care Settings," the National Commission on AIDS
observed:
In making risk calculations, people tend to overlook pal-
pable, everyday risks, such as those associated with driv-
ing a car or smoking cigarettes, as compared with more
127. In determining the magnitude of the risk in transmission of HTV cases,
Professor Oddi has applied the property damage analysis in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. Oddi, supra note 3, at 1458. Section 293(a) states that the
first factor to consider is "the social value which the law attaches to the
interests which are imperiled." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293(a)
(1965). Professor Oddi argues that since society places a higher value on the
services of HCWs than those of patients, "non-disclosure by patients presents a
higher risk than by [HCWs] in the context of whose life is imperiled." Oddi,
supra note 3, at 1458. Thus, the interests of the imperiled HCWs outweighs the
interests of the imperiled patients on the basis of whom society values more.
Id. Similarly, section 293(c) states that another factor to consider is "the extent
of the harm likely to be caused by the interests imperiled." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 293(c) (1965). Professor Oddi argues that since a HCW's
earning capacity is generally higher than that of the average patient, he suffers
more if he is infected than if he infects a patient. Oddi, supra note 3, at 1458.
While this approach has a certain analytical appeal, it is morally
questionable at best. Professor Oddi's position implies that a person's earning
capacity is a surrogate for that person's value to society. While this idea makes
it easy to calculate "value," most persons probably feel that value should not be
measured solely in monetary terms. Under the analysis Oddi suggests, the
"value" of a mother raising three children instead of holding a paying job would
be less than the "value" of a paid fast-food worker.
128. See generally Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1392 (W.D. Mich.
1993) (balancing "very high" risk associated with HIV transmission in deciding
whether sexual partner has a duty to warn that he or she has HIV).
129. Instead, a driver has a legal duty to maintain reasonable control of the
automobile and to be vigilant of the possibility of danger to others. If a "reason-
able" driver would have avoided the accident, the driver is liable for the conse-
quences. The decision to permit the use of automobiles is based on the burden
of imposing a duty not to do so. The individual driver (and society) benefits
greatly from being permitted to drive. The fact that death may result from any
given activity is not dispositive of the question of whether a duty to refrain from
engaging in the activity exists.
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remote, but dreaded risks. Perceptions of risk are height-
ened if the source of the risk is not observed or detectable.
Unfamiliar risks or those involving scientific unknowns
are particularly dreaded, as are risks from sources beyond
one's control. HIV transmission in the health care setting
is one example of a risk in which the public has taken
great interest. As knowledge about HIV has evolved and
as experts have publicly disagreed on many aspects of
HIV transmission, there has been much public skepti-
cism. Some pronouncements by experts and government
officials have fueled public fears unnecessarily .... 130
Nevertheless, many of the cases considering HIV-related
issues have emphasized the severity of consequences from ac-
quiring HIV, and ultimately AIDS, in arriving at decisions.
In Doe v. Johnson,131 a case brought by a plaintiff against
basketball star Magic Johnson, a federal district court consid-
ered whether a claim for "negligent transmission of HLV"
stated a cause of action under Michigan law. 13 2 The court
was clearly swayed by the severity of the risk of acquiring
HIV, observing that "[d]eath is often the consequence of this
disease,"13 and stating that "[w]hen an individual has
knowledge[,] . .. the burden on that individual in revealing
his or her HIV virus information is minimal when compared
to the high risks of the disease."134
This tendency of the courts to overemphasize the magni-
tude of the harm in AIDS cases has a number of sources.
First, lay people generally do not assign weight to a risk ac-
cording to the actual probability that the risk will material-
ize. 135 This bias leads to systematic and predictable errors in
judgment in dealing with situations of uncertainty. 136 Hence,
the serious consequences of AIDS leads courts to overempha-
size the magnitude of its harm without discounting for the
likelihood of its transmission.
130. NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, PREVENTING HIV TRANSMISSION IN HEALTH
CARE SETTINGS 19 (1992).
131. 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
132. Doe, 817 F. Supp at 1386.
133. Id. at 1392.
134. Id. at 1393.
135. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (concluding that the heuristic
devices that people use to calculate probabilities in situations of uncertainty
have no connection to the statistical likelihood of an event's occurrence).
136. Id. at 1131.
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Furthermore, because of the stigma attached to the dis-
ease and the persons who carry the virus, one cannot help but
suspect that the courts are especially sympathetic to plain-
tiffs who allege that someone has given them HIV. A number
of courts have alluded to the particularly emotional reactions
of many people to HIV. 137
This stigma has its origin in how the public perceives the
danger of AIDS. AIDS falls within the category of dangers
described as "dread risks.' 3  A "dread risk" is defined by a
"perceived lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal
consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and
benefits.' 3 9 Significantly, the higher a risk scores on the
dread risk scale, the higher its perceived risk in the public
eye.' 4 ° AIDS clearly qualifies as a "dread risk" - it inspires
dread in the public at large and is nearly always fatal. As a
dread risk, the public and courts perceive AIDS to be a
greater risk than it actually is."14 For these reasons, courts
137. See M.M.H. v. United States, 966 F.2d 285, 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1992)
(action for misdiagnosis of HIV may state a cause of action for emotional dis-
tress damages even in the absence of physical injury because AIDS is "a fatal
disease that is shrouded in mystery and stigma"); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198
Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 n.3 (Ct. App. 1984) (permitting action for misrepresentation
that one does not have genital herpes, because "[1]ike AIDS, [genital herpes] is
now known by the public to be a contagious and dreadful disease"). Other
courts have bordered on giving official sanction to conduct that would otherwise
be considered reprehensible because the conduct was motivated by an irrational
fear of HIV. In Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987), the
court held that a landlord violated state laws barring housing discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation and disability when he refused to rent an apart-
ment to three gay men whom he feared would get AIDS. The court recom-
mended against imposing harsh fees or penalties against the landlord, however:
[Tihe landlord's refusal to rent did not appear to be motivated by spite
or malice directed against any particular group, but rather out of fear
that his family might be exposed to a terrifying disease .... The fact
that those fears are ill-founded does not detract from their reality to
the person who fears.
Poff, 549 A.2d at 905.
138. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. In addition, it has been suggested that HIV's presence in blood, se-
men, saliva, and tears also accounts for the stigma attached to AIDS. Id. These
fluids are cultural symbols for impurity, pollution, and danger. See id. Since
HIV (and ultimately AIDS) is transmitted through these heavily symbolic me-
dia, HIV infection represents a kind of personal defilement, as well as an actual
danger. Id.
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are likely to assign the risk of AIDS more weight than the
statistics would otherwise indicate. 142
b. The Reduced Likelihood of the Harm
The key inquiry is whether the averted danger outweighs
the burden of imposing a duty on a patient to disclose HIV
status to a HCW. Even in "high risk" interactions such as
invasive surgery, the risk of HIV transmission from patient
to HCW is very small. As of 1991, there were only twenty-
four confirmed cases in which health care workers had be-
come infected through contact with patients. 143 This low fig-
ure is understandable in light of the number of factors that
must coincide before transmission occurs: some sort of acci-
dent, such as a needle prick or scalpel cut, that would provide
a conduit for transmission; actual contact with infectious ma-
terial; and actual viral infection. A few courts have acknowl-
edged the difficulty of transmitting HIV.14 4 But the majority
of cases contain little or no discussion of how small the risk
actually is.145
Moreover, the key question is whether the risk of harm is
reduced by patient disclosure of HIV status. The assertion
that HCWs who are unaware that they are providing care to
an HIV-positive patient face a substantially greater risk of
harm is highly suspect. Published studies have questioned
whether HCWs can behave any more carefully around pa-
tients whom they know to be HIV positive than with patients
about whom they have no information about their serologic
status.
One study at a major urban hospital questions an essen-
tial premise of a claim based on failure to disclose - namely,
that the HCW's knowledge that a patient is HIV positive will
enable the HCW to take extraordinary precautions in order to
avoid HIV transmission.146 Nurses at San Francisco General
142. MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER 114 (1966); Leon Eisenberg, The
Genesis of Fear: AIDS and the Public's Response to Science, 14 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 243, 245 (1986).
143. American Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 824 (7th Cir. 1993).
144. Id. "The AIDS virus is not ... easily transmitted in the sorts of contact
that patients usually have with health care workers." Id. See also Doe v. John-
son, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1392-93 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
145. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 175, n.3 (Ct. App. 1994).
146. Gerberding et al., Risk of Exposure of Surgical Personnel to Patients'
Blood During Surgery at San Francisco General Hospital, 322 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1788 (1990).
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Hospital kept notes of the number of exposures to blood in
1307 consecutive surgeries. 147 The study found that regard-
less of whether the operating room personnel knew that the
patient had HIV, the incidence of exposure to blood was ap-
proximately the same. 148 If knowledge of a patient's HIV sta-
tus does not affect the health care worker's chances that he or
she will be exposed, then not disclosing one's HIV status
presents no risk to the health care worker.1 49
A HCW's knowledge of a patient's HIV status may in fact
increase the risk of harm. The CDC's universal precautions
approach would be undermined by a rule requiring patient
disclosure. As discussed more fully in part V.C, if a duty to
disclose were imposed, some HCWs might rely on the pa-
tient's disclosure of his or her HIV status in deciding whether
to employ universal precautions. Lulled by a false sense of
security, HCWs would not follow the universal precautions
unless a patient indicated that he was HIV negative. Since
many persons do not know their HIV status, and since the
HIV antibody tests require up to six months to give definitive
results, HCWs cannot rely on patients' representations of
HIV-negative status.
2. Burden Imposed by the Duty
The impact of disclosure may well cause more than psy-
chological damage, particularly for a patient who must dis-
close his HIV condition to a HCW.' 50 A number of studies
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1788-93. See also Tokars et al., Percutaneous Injuries During
Surgical Procedures, 267 JAMA 2899, 2899-2904 (1992).
149. Some authors have questioned the element of causation in a negligence
action based on a patient's failure to disclose his HIV status. See Lawrence
Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive Proce-
dures, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32 (Jan.-Feb. 1989) (patient disclosure irrelevant
since HCWs have a legal and moral duty to test even when informed of a pa-
tient's HIV status); Steven Eisenstat, The HIV Infected Health Care Worker:
The New AIDS Scapegoat, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 301 (1992) (patient disclosure
irrelevant since HCWs already are obligated to follow universal procedures and
thus cannot undertake any additional precautions).
150. While Professor Oddi admits that a patient who discloses his HIV sta-
tus bears a burden, he underestimates the weight of that burden and ascribes
too much significance to the ability of laws and professional norms to control
prejudice against individuals infected with HIV. Oddi, supra note 3, at 1462.
He argues that the burden consists "only of the risk of confidentiality being
breached by the [HCW]." Id. He does concede, however, that if confidentiality
is breached, the potential for loss is great, although he does not explore the
ramifications of that potential loss. Id. However, the burden imposed by the
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have revealed that many HCWs, including physicians, prefer
not to deal with HIV-infected patients at all.151 More to the
point, a very high percentage of primary care physicians, per-
haps as many as fifty percent, take steps to avoid treating
HIV-infected patients. 152 This unwillingness to provide
treatment has its source in the unfavorable attitudes physi-
cians hold towards gay men, who make up a large section of
the HIV-infected population.1 5 3 An HIV-infected patient re-
quired to disclose his or her status may be refused treatment
duty to disclose goes further. In light of the prejudices felt by members of the
health care community and the reality of discrimination against patients with
HIV, Professor Oddi's reliance on the protections extended to such patients by
the Americans With Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1988 & Supp. 1993), and. American Medical Association ethical norms is
unrealistic.
151. See Martin F. Shapiro et al., Residents' Experiences in, and Attitudes
Toward, the Care of Persons with AIDS in Canada, France, and the United
States, 268 JAMA 510 (1992). This article reported the results of a question-
naire survey mailed to residents in their last year in internal medicine or fam-
ily medicine in Canada, France and the United States. Id. Twenty-three per-
cent of U.S. physicians surveyed indicated that they would not care for AIDS
patients if they had a choice. Nineteen percent of the U.S. physicians also re-
ported that they knew of an AIDS patient who had been refused treatment by a
medical specialist, and 39% of U.S. physicians reported that they knew of an
AIDS patient who was refused treatment by a surgeon. Id. See also Jeffrey
Kelly et al., Stigmatization of AIDS Patients by Physicians, 77 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH 789, 790 (1987) (study finding that physicians are much more unwilling
to deal with patients with AIDS than patients with leukemia, even in casual
interactions that carried no risk of transmitting HIV). This stigmatization sug-
gests that HIV-infected individuals will encounter more attitude negativity and
avoidance than patients with other serious illnesses. Id. at 791. Furthermore,
that study found that physicians considered AIDS patients to be "more deserv-
ing of what [had] happened to [them]" than leukemia patients. Id. at 790. See
R. Nathan Link et al., Concerns of Medical and Pediatric House Officers About
Acquiring AIDS from Their Patients, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 455, 457 (1988)
(finding that 25% of house officers surveyed would not continue to care for AIDS
patients if given a choice).
152. See C. Lewis & K. Montgomery, Primary Care Physicians' Refusal to
Care for Patients with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 156 W.J. MED. 36,
38 (1992) (telephone survey of primary care physicians in Los Angeles found
that "almost half" of such physicians "may have already rejected HIV-infected
patients or plan not to accept them as regular patients").
A few courts have taken note of the fact that physicians, as well as the
general public, "irrationally" fear patients with HIV. Doe v. Barrington, 729 F.
Supp. 376, 384 n.8 (D.N.J. 1990); Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d
1251, 1272 n.12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
153. William C. Matthews, Physician's Attitudes Toward Homosexuality -
Survey of a California County Medical Society, 144 W.J. MED. 106, 109-10
(1986) (survey found 25% of respondents had strongly negative attitudes to-
wards homosexuality and 30% would not admit a homosexual applicant to med-
ical school). Since this survey occurred before widespread publicity linking
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and may have to search out physicians willing to provide ba-
sic medical care, even for conditions that are unrelated to
HIV status.
A HCW's knowledge that a patient is HIV positive can
also influence the quality of treatment the patient receives.
One study of six neonatal intensive care units in New York
City found that HCWs recommended less aggressive treat-
ment for infants who had HIV-positive mothers than for in-
fants with similar conditions who did not have such mothers
- even though the respondents were asked questions regard-
ing treatment of a condition thought to be unrelated to HIV
disease, a duodenal atresia."' This finding suggests that pa-
tients with HIV, particularly those not in a position to par-
ticipate in decisions regarding their own medical care, such
as infants, incompetents, and patients whose hospitalization
is paid for through public funding, may receive inferior medi-
cal treatment solely because of the perception that their lives
are worth less because they have HIV.
A patient who must disclose his HIV status to a HCW
also faces the possibility that this fact will not remain confi-
dential, exposing him to the stigma and prejudice that per-
sons with AIDS and HIV so often experience.' 55 Ethical
norms bind physicians to keep information provided to them
confidential.15 6 And many, if not all states, require all per-
male homosexual behavior to AIDS, the study suggests that there was a sub-
stantial antecedent stigma associated with homosexuality. Id.
154. Betty Wolder Levin et al., Treatment Choice for Infants in the Neonatal
Intensive Care Unit at Risk for AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976 (1991).
155. AIDS brings with it a special stigma. Attitude surveys show that
even though most Americans understand the modes through which
HIV is spread, a significant minority still would exclude those who are
HIV positive from schools, public accommodations, and the workplace.
Unauthorized disclosure of a person's serologic status can lead to social
opprobrium among family and friends, as well as loss of employment,
housing and insurance.
Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr., 592 A.2d 1251, 1269-70 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991) (citing Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals, and
AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48
MD. L. REV. 12, 46 (1989).
156. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957)
provides:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the
course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the
character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or unless it
becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the individual or of
the community.
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sons receiving information regarding another person's HIV
status to keep that information confidential. 157 In practice,
however, there is no way to guarantee that information re-
garding a patient's HIV status will not be disseminated be-
yond the patient's health care providers.
15 8
The creation of a patient's duty to disclose his HIV status
can also lead to the disclosure of private facts that do not nec-
essarily mean the patient is HIV positive. As noted above, a
duty to disclose may not be limited to cases in which the pa-
tient has actual knowledge that he has HIV.1 59 Some cases
Id.
157. See infra note 171, containing a list of such statutes enacted in the 10
largest states.
158. In Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991), the court described how the efforts of a hospital to keep the
fact that one of its physicians (who was also a patient at the hospital) had
tested HIV positive failed:
According to stated policy, charts were limited to those persons
having patient-care responsibility, but in practical terms, the charts
were available to any doctor, nurse or other hospital personnel. De-
spite the CDC's recommendation that access to HIV results be limited,
the medical center had no policy physically restricting access to the
HIV test results or the charts containing the results to those involved
with the particular patient's care.
... Given the significance of a physician-patient with a diagnosis
of AIDS and the lack of special procedures directed at securing confi-
dentiality, the inevitable happened.... [W]ithin hours, word of plain-
tiff's illness was "on the street."
Id. at 1262-63. See also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 639 N.E.2d 683, 683-84 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994) (describing how plaintiff's HIV status was revealed to his co-
workers after plaintiff informed paramedics that he was HIV positive).
159. In cases in which a duty to disclose the existence of an infectious disease
was found, some courts have decided that a duty to disclose exists when the
defendant actually knew or reasonably should have known he or she was
infected.
For example, in Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993), the
court held that the complaint, alleging emotional distress deriving from fear
that the plaintiff would acquire HIV, stated a cause of action against her sexual
partner to the extent that the defendant had knowledge he was actually in-
fected with HIV, knew that he had symptoms associated with the virus, or knew
of a prior sex partner who was diagnosed as having the virus, but rejected plain-
tiff's contention that defendant had a duty to warn if he had engaged in "high
risk" sexual activity, or if he belonged to a group at high risk for HIV. Id. at
1393. See also Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987),
aff'd in pertinent part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988); C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d
441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (although an HIV-infected sexual partner could
not have known he was infected given the state of medical knowledge in 1985, a
sexual partner must disclose HIV status when he or she has actual or imputed
knowledge that he or she is infectious). C.f. Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564, 567
(Ct. App. 1990) (defendant who knew he had herpes but believed that he was
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have indicated that a person who has a duty to disclose to
another that he has HIV also has such a duty if the person
has manifested symptoms associated with HIV, or has had
sex with a partner known to be infected with HIV. And at
least one case has considered, but rejected, the notion that a
person who has engaged in high risk sexual behavior owes a
duty to disclose this fact to his sexual partner.160 Thus, pa-
tients may be required to divulge to HCWs information of the
most personal sort, such as sexual orientation, sexual history,
sexual practices, and past drug use. Should the duty to dis-
close be expanded this far, even persons not confirmed as HIV
positive may experience stigma and the same barriers to
medical treatment that persons who are know to be HIV posi-
tive face. 16 1
not infectious because he did not manifest the disease's symptoms held liable
for failure to disclose his infection; although some authority supported defend-
ant's assertion that the state of the medical knowledge at the time of the inci-
dent was unclear, defendant failed to show that he relied on a doctor's advice).
160. Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1393 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
161. Arguably, even a negative result on an HIV test would not extinguish a
duty to disclose risk factors. The six month "window" period during which a
person may have HIV but not test positive for HIV antibodies means that a
negative HIV test is no guarantee that the person does not have HIV.
Testing individuals for the AIDS virus usually entails performing
an Enzyme Linked Immunosorbant Assay (hereinafter ELISA), and
confirming a positive finding by the Western Blot test. These tests do
not directly identify the presence of HIV. Rather, they detect whether
the individual's immune system has developed antibodies to the virus
("seroconversion"). Antibodies are formed as a means to combat vi-
ruses and infections. The HIV antibody usually forms within several
weeks to months after HIV infection. Thus, a positive ELISA and
Western Blot test indicates only that the individual has been infected,
and is capable of transmitting the virus. It does not indicate that the
persons has AIDS, or if or when the person will develop the syndrome.
In addition, the fact that an individual tests negative for the pres-
ence of the antibody does not indicate that he or she is not presently
infected. Because the tests detect the presence of the antibody only, if
seroconversion has not yet occurred an individual will receive a nega-
tive test result, yet still carry the virus. Given that it may take six
months or longer after transmission before antibodies are produced, an
individual will receive negative test results during that time, and yet
be infected and infectious. There exists, therefore, a "window" between
the time a person becomes infected, and when he or she seroconverts.
Thus, the ELISA and Western Blot test are underinclusive, because
they do not detect those infected individuals who have yet to
seroconvert.
Moreover, neither the ELISA nor the Western Blot test is 100%
accurate in detecting all individuals who have actually seroconverted.
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C. Public Policy
Reducing the transmission of HIV in the health care set-
ting is an important public policy concern. In deciding
whether to recognize a cause of action for HIV transmission
in this context, courts or legislatures should consider its im-
pact on public policy.
Imposing liability on a patient for not disclosing his or
her HIV status is inconsistent with American public policy.
As discussed in greater detail below, imposing a duty on a
patient to disclose his or her HIV status subverts three signif-
icant goals of public health care policy: (1) it undermines the
important federal policies aimed at preventing HIV transmis-
sion in the health care setting; (2) it reduces the access of
HIV-positive patients to health care; and (3) it undercuts the
public policy in most jurisdictions that individuals, including
patients, should be permitted to keep their HIV status
private.
First, requiring patients to disclose to HCWs that they
are HIV positive threatens to undermine the existing ap-
proach to reduce HIV transmission in the health care field.
OSHA regulations promulgated in 1991 require that every
health care facility follow a great number of procedures
designed to reduce the risk of occupational exposure to
HIV. 162 HCWs must follow these procedures, the universal
precautions, during the treatment of every patient, not just
while treating those who are known or suspected to be in-
fected with HIV. 163 The regulations state that they must be
The accuracy of these tests is measured by the proportion of the in-
fected people who actually test positive (sensitivity), and the propor-
tion of the uninfected individuals who actually test negative (specific-
ity). The ELISA is credited with a 99.7% sensitivity rate and a 98.5%
specificity rate. The Western Blot, when used to confirm a positive
ELISA test, has a 99.3% sensitivity rate, and a 91.6% specificity rate.
... Testing would also result in falsely identifying infected HCWs
as being uninfected. Due to the window of infection, HIV tests will not
locate those HCWs who are infected but have yet to form antibodies to
the virus. Thus, even with screening once or twice a year, some in-
fected HCWs will still be unidentified. The ramifications of these false
results would be that those HCWs incorrectly informed of their nega-
tive status may feel a false sense of security, and thus relax their com-
pliance with infection control procedures. As a result, patients of these
HCWs would actually be placed at an increased risk of infection.
Eisenstat, supra note 149, at 328-29.
162. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1995).
163. Id.
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followed for every patient because there is no reliable way to
know whether a given patient is infected with HIV.16 4 Pa-
tients may not know they are infected, or they may be reluc-
tant to inform their health care provider that they are in-
fected. The problem of obtaining reliable information
regarding any given patient's HIV status would remain even
if every patient were tested for HIV because current methods
test for antibodies to HIV, not HIV itself. Because antibodies
to HIV usually do not form until three to six months after
HIV infection has occurred, the test does not detect HIV in
patients who have been recently infected. 165
Requiring a patient to disclose that he has HIV under-
mines the universal precautions system. The CDC, which de-
veloped the universal precautions approach, found that in-
forming HCWs which patients have HIV reduces the
likelihood that the HCWs will follow HIV infection control
procedures when treating patients who are not identified as
HIV positive. Many HCWs tend to assume that if a patient
has not been identified as HIV positive, the patient is not
likely to be HIV positive. They will then often not follow in-
fection control procedures that do not appear to be war-
ranted, although such procedures are mandated by federal
law. 166 Reliance on seronegative test results also undercuts
the CDC's policy that universal precautions be followed on a
routine basis. 167 The policy envisions HCWs using universal
precautions until doing so becomes second nature - espe-
cially important with respect to less trained and sophisti-
cated HCWs. Mistakes will occur more often if people have to
think about precautions on a case-by-case basis, depending
on the perceived danger of HIV transmission. When using
the universal precautions becomes rote, errors will occur less
frequently.
164. Id.
165. See Commentary, The Risk of Contracting HIV Infection in the Course of
Health Care, 265 JAMA 1872 (1991) (statement authored by New York Acad-
emy of Medicine recommending against mandatory testing of health care work-
ers because, inter alia, the inability of the HIV test to detect HLV reliably until
six months after exposure would mean that mandatory testing would not neces-
sarily prevent transmission of HIV in the health care setting).
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1995); see also Joint Advisory Notice, 52 Fed.
Reg. 41818, 41820 (1987).
167. See Joint Advisory Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 41818, 41820 (1987) (noting
that false sense of security derived from patients' seronegative results may re-
duce the level of routine vigilance).
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Second, mandatory disclosure will reduce HIV-infected
persons' access to health care treatment. As noted above,
several studies have revealed that many health care facilities
and professionals refuse to treat HIV-infected persons -
either by refusing to treat, by declining to treat based on a
bad faith medical judgment that the risks of the procedure
outweigh the anticipated benefits of treatment, by referring
the patients to physicians who are willing to treat, or by spe-
cializing in areas not likely to involve the care of HIV-infected
persons.1 68 Even assuming that most patients with HIV can
find facilities to provide regular ongoing care,1 69 requiring
them to disclose their HIV status when they seek treatment
may mean that they will have difficulty finding treatment
when they cannot go to their regular provider for care, such
as in emergencies or when in rural areas or areas not well
served by medical facilities.170
Third, in many jurisdictions, state legislatures have en-
acted statutes to preserve the individual's right to keep his
HIV status a private matter.171 The California statute, for
168. The 1991 Report of the National Commission on AIDS, America Living
with AIDS, reported:
The reasons [HCWs have been reluctant to care for HIV infected
persons] include low reimbursement rates for people whose care is paid
for by Medicaid; a lack of familiarity with and understanding of treat-
ment for the disease; fear of becoming infected during the course of
treating patients; discomfort in treating gay men or intravenous drug
users; and unease in dealing with the psychological stresses of caring
for dying young patients with multiple physical and psychological
needs.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, AMERICA LING wITH AIDS 50 (1991).
169. In fact, there probably will not be enough facilities willing to treat HIV-
related conditions to meet the increasing number of patients with this condi-
tion. One study noted that, based on a survey of physicians in Los Angeles, only
15% of physicians who do not currently treat patients with HIV would be will-
ing to do so. See Lewis & Montgomery, supra note 152, at 38.
170. A number of health care professional organizations and ethicists have
stated that it is unethical for health care workers to refuse to treat patients
based on their HIV status. See, e.g., Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Ethi-
cal Issues Involved in the Growing AIDS Crisis, 259 JAMA 1360 (1988) ("A phy-
sician may not ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition is within the
physician's current realm of competence solely because the patient is
seropositive.").
171. A survey of the 10 largest states, which collectively contain more than
50% of the population of the United States, indicates that all of these have laws
prohibiting the disclosure of a person's HIV test results. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 199.21 (West 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw 2782 (McKinney
1993); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 81.103 (West 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
381.004(0 (West 1993); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7602 (Supp 1994); ILL.
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example, imposes civil and criminal penalties for disclosing a
person's HIV status absent a legal right to do so. This law
advances the policy of ensuring the confidentiality of the HIV
status of its citizens. Such laws reflect a decision that a per-
son's right to confidentiality outweighs the needs of others to
know whether a given person has HIV absent a legal right to
the information. 7 ' Courts asked to impose a duty to disclose
should hesitate when confidentiality laws exist, because
these laws suggest that the legislature has already consid-
REV. STAT. ch. 410, para. 305/9 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243 (Ander-
son 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5131(1) (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-7,
10 (West Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-143 (1995).
172. For example, in Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup.
Ct. 1992), the court relied on the existence of an HIV confidentiality statute to
define a police officer's duty of care in transporting an HIV-infected prisoner to
a physician for medical care. The court found that the statute requiring all
individuals having knowledge of another person's HIV status to keep that infor-
mation confidential meant that the police officer's duty to keep the information
confidential outweighed any duty he may have had to inform the physician that
the prisoner was HIV positive. Id. at 1017.
However, some courts have interpreted their state's HIV confidentiality
statutes as not furthering any independent privacy interest on the part of the
patient. In In re Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, 634 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1993),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a lower court's decision which author-
ized two hospitals to disclose that one of their physicians was HIV positive to
the physician's patients. The court observed:
[D]isclosure was clearly consistent with the primary purpose of the
HIV Act. That purpose... was to reduce the spread of HIV and AIDS.
... Confidentiality was not the purpose of the Act, but rather was the
means chosen to further the Act's goal of limiting the spread of HIV
and AIDS.
Id. at 162-63.
In Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W.
Va. 1991), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld an award of
emotional distress damages against a hospital which failed to disclose to a po-
lice officer that a patient he had been called to restrain had AIDS. Id. at 894.
The court rejected the hospital's argument that damages for failure to disclose
that a patient was HIV positive was inconsistent with the state's law guaran-
teeing the confidentiality of HIV test results. Id. at 895. "This case does not
involve a situation where a patient was tested for AIDS. Rather, in this case,
hospital personnel failed to warn an unsuspecting officer of an AIDS-infected
patient's condition." Id. at 895. In a footnote, the court displayed some ambiva-
lence toward this argument, contending that even if the statute prohibited the
hospital from posting a warning of the patient's condition, the hospital could
not rely on the statute because its own regulations mandated such a warning.
Id. at 895 n.6. Some courts have recognized the inherently private nature of a
person's HIV status, independent of any statute. See Doe v. Methodist Hosp.,
639 N.E.2d 683, 686 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App.) (Najam, J., dissenting).
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ered and reached a decision regarding whose interests are
paramount. 173
D. Authority and Competence of the Courts
With growing frequency, courts will face the question of
whether a patient must disclose HIV infection to HCWs. In
most cases, plaintiffs will ask the courts to decide this issue
which executive agencies and legislatures have already ad-
dressed. As set forth above, a great number of policy consid-
erations would be implicated by such a decision. Under long
held principles of jurisprudence, courts should refrain, when
possible, from making public policy; ordinarily, this is the
proper function of the legislature and executive agencies.
174
At the very least, courts should not decide cases in a manner
that contravenes public policy.
At both the federal and state level, executive agencies
have promulgated various policies to deal with the AIDS epi-
demic. Those policies have rejected the idea of mandatory
disclosure of HIV status. At the federal level, the CDC's uni-
versal precautions approach rejects the idea of differential
treatment for HIV-positive patients and calls for strict infec-
tion control practices with all patients. 1 75 OSHA adopted the
same approach by making those precautions binding on all
health care facilities. 176 Similarly, the Department of Labor
and the Department of Health and Human Services pub-
lished a Joint Advisory Notice recommending that all bodily
fluids be treated as if contaminated with HIV.17 7 Several
state departments of health have agreed with the CDC that
173. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, courts have construed the HIV con-
fidentiality statutes to permit a HCW to disclose a patient's HIV status. For
example, one opinion by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals suggests
that a hospital has a duty to post a notice next to the patient's bed if the patient
is HIV positive. See Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W.
Va. 1991). These rulings arguably misconstrue the intent of the legislature.
174. E.g., Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584 (Ct. App. 1991) (court de-
clined to impose liability in a medical malpractice case in which the plaintiff
alleged that as a result of the physician's delayed diagnosis of plaintiff's lung
cancer, a lower than 50% chance that the cancer could have been treated was
lost. The basis for the decision was that policy considerations, such as encour-
aging unwarranted testing and potential impact on health insurance premi-
ums, would "intrude upon the Legislature's task of weighing such matters of
public policy.").
175. CDC Recommendations, supra note 8.
176. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1995).
177. Joint Advisory Notice, 52 Fed. Reg. 41818, 41820 (1987).
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universal precautions are the best way to prevent HIV trans-
mission in the health care setting, thus adopting a view that
patient disclosure is not necessary or desirable.
This consideration assumes especially great importance
when the question before the court has been considered by
lawmaking bodies. In many ways, asking a court to require a
patient to disclose his HIV status is similar to asking it to
rule on whether a health care facility may test a patient for
HIV without obtaining the patient's consent. In the case of
mandatory testing, the physician or health care facility runs
an HIV test on a blood sample taken before the invasive pro-
cedure is performed to ascertain the patient's HIV status -
the same information the patient must divulge if the courts
impose a duty to disclose.
Congress has also considered and rejected mandatory
testing of all patients. In August and September 1991, legis-
lation was introduced in Congress regarding the issue of HIV
in the health care setting, including the "Kimberly Bergalis"
amendment that would have mandated testing of patients
and HCWs involved in invasive procedures. 178 On October 3,
1991, Congress passed a version of the bill that did not in-
clude the Kimberly Bergalis amendment; instead, the bill
permitted each state to either adopt the CDC guidelines or
propose a substitute measure equivalent to the CDC
guidelines. 179
Administrative agencies and legislatures at the federal
and state level have formulated policies to deal with AIDS in
the health care setting. These policies reject the idea of
mandatory patient disclosure and emphasize the use by
HCWs of universal precautions to prevent transmission of
HIV. Courts should hesitate to impose a duty to disclose
when that would disrupt the emerging public policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
A patient should be under no duty to disclose his or her
HIV status to a HCW. Neither the traditional test for legal
duty, in which the risk of harm is weighed against the burden
of the duty, nor existing public health policies support the
existence of such a duty.
178. See H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
179. See H.R. 2622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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The issue of whether a duty exists is always a question
that a court must consider and rule on before the question of
whether a duty was breached is submitted to the jury. And it
is the duty of the courts, not juries, to define the outer limits
of what is reasonable. One part of a court's analysis is
whether there is any significant risk to the type of conduct
that the duty under consideration would proscribe. Another
significant component of a court's job is to assess whether im-
posing a duty violates public policy.
Even before the CDC promulgated the system of univer-
sal precautions, studies concluded that the risk of patient to
HCW transmission of HIV is extremely low. After universal
precautions became binding on all health care providers in
1993, the likelihood of transmission from patient to HCW
should be even less, because these strict infection control pro-
cedures greatly reduce the risk of transmission. Thus, the
imposition of a legal duty to disclose HIV status on a patient
would serve little good - and, as a matter of public health
policy, may even do harm.
The concept of universal precautions is dependent upon
an unwavering presumption on the part of all HCWs that all
patients are potentially infectious. The reason for such an as-
sumption is not obvious. Proponents of extending liability to
patients who do not disclose their HIV status argue that the
HCW derives a benefit from knowing a patient is HIV posi-
tive because the HCW can take heightened precautions when
treating that patient. This argument has superficial logical
appeal, but misses the important psychological insights upon
which the architects of universal precautions based their
system.
The first insight is that human beings learn work habits
best when the patterns are repeated again and again, so that
it becomes automatic. Permitting HCWs to treat patients dif-
ferently, based on knowledge or assumptions about the pa-
tient's HIV status, breaks up the routine and so interferes
with the behavior that must be learned. The second, and
more important insight, is that having HCWs apply different
(and lesser) infection control procedures to persons who are
known or believed to be HIV positive creates a suggestion
that this group of patients is without members who are HIV
positive. That erroneous assumption, made thoughtlessly
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during the bustle of work at a modern hospital, can lead to
lax behavior and increase the likelihood of transmission.
Requiring a patient to disclose his or her HIV status to a
HCW imposes a clear cost to the patient. Sadly, after nearly
fourteen years of living with the disease, many people in
American society, including HCWs, still view AIDS and HIV
with a special horror and revulsion. A patient might be re-
fused treatment, or may decide not to seek treatment, if re-
quired to disclose his or her HIV status.
Recent rulings in a number of states, including such
large jurisdictions as California, have imposed greater re-
quirements on the type of showing a plaintiff must make to
recover for transmission, or fear of transmission, of the dis-
ease. While this is a welcome trend, these cases have focused
on the type of evidence necessary to establish causation or
damages. They leave untouched the real issue - whether a
duty to disclose exists at all - and therefore leave open the
possibility that patients will be sued for not disclosing their
HIV status. It is time that the idea that a patient has a duty
to disclose disease status is challenged directly.
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